Trump’s Second Term: Who Shapes U.S. Policy Toward Europe?

Donald Trump’s return to the White House has generated anxious anticipation regarding changes in American foreign policy. Moreover, the various diplomatic and political signals preceding and at the Munich Security Conference epitomized a boldness superseding the previous Trump administration with greater consequences to European security due to the ongoing Ukrainian war. 

To better understand the direction of U.S. policy, this article analyzes key officials within the national security apparatus: Elbridge A. Colby, the nominated Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USDP), Andrew Peek, Senior Director of Europe at the National Security Council (NSC), and Keith Kellogg, Presidential Envoy for Ukrainian Russian Affairs. Additionally, it examines the absence of high-level appointments in the State Department’s European roles and its potential impact on policy.

The Pentagon’s Strategist: Elbridge A. Colby

On March 4th, the Senate Armed Services Committee held a confirmation for Colby, the penultimate step to assuming the position of Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USDP). With a career spanning the Department of Defense, State, and Intelligence Community, Colby has played a key role in shaping strategic policies, including drafting the Pentagon’s 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Force Development. As USDP, he will hold significant authority over regional defense strategies, budgeting, and military priorities, effectively positioning him as the Pentagon’s policy lead. 

Colby’s policy positions are articulated in various documents such as the 2018 NDS and multiple publications. His views on European security are framed through the primacy of the Chinese threat, advocating for reduced U.S. defence expenditure in Europe while urging European and Middle Eastern allies to increase defence spending. Colby underscores his position by asserting that European allies have received repeated warnings over the years and that continued reliance on U.S. defense support without greater burden-sharing is no longer sustainable. Practically, this would entail a smaller troop presence in Europe, preservation of the diminishing defense industrial base, and increased pressure on European allies to meet their defense spending obligations. 

He further calls on Europeans to return to Cold War-era expenditures of 3-4% of GDP on defence spending mirroring Secretary Hegseth’s statements. When asked whether tariffs might be used to pressure allies into meeting such commitments, Colby avoided a direct answer, instead suggesting that alliances should be approached strategically, with both incentives and penalties used to encourage the desired behaviour.

Connecting Colby’s Pentagon experience, USDP authority, and stated positions, it appears his role may focus more on framing overarching defense policy objectives than implementing policies downstream. His approach toward Europe may manifest through using incentives and pressures to influence NATO allies, with significant implications for Ukraine and Central European states.

Andrew Peek at the NSC

Andrew Peek serves as Senior Director of Europe at the NSC, weaving together experiences in Congress, the US Army, academia, and the Department of State. His notable roles include the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Near Eastern Affairs, responsible for policy on Iran and Iraq from 2017-2019, Senior Director of European and Russian at the NSC from 2019-2020, and national security aide to Congressman Mike Waltz. Peek reportedly plays a significant role in White House policy and interagency coordination on Europe, Russia, and Ukraine.

Despite his policy experience, Peek has limited published positions on Ukraine and Europe. However, his association with Rep. Mike Waltz’s foreign policy stances suggest alignment with Waltz’s initial support for Ukrainian military aid. Early in the war, Peek emphasized the need for forward-leaning U.S. military assistance to boost the Ukrainian military’s ability to change facts on the ground, coupled with negotiations with Russia aimed at quickly translating military gains into achievable political outcomes. He also argues that taking a more proactive role in military aid would allow the U.S. to shape the terms of a settlement, rather than leaving that influence to European powers.

Peek also criticises President Macron’s proposal to offer Putin an off-ramp to avoid humiliation, arguing instead that the West should leverage Putin’s fear of humiliation to secure more favourable terms in any settlement. Most notably, Peek contends that the political end state must go beyond addressing Russia’s actions in Ukraine – it should fundamentally alter Russian strategic behaviour. This, he suggests, can be achieved by linking multiple areas of Russian interest, creating trade-offs that weaken both its tangible influence and broader geopolitical credibility.

Peek’s role at the NSC places him at the intersection of political pressures, strategic priorities, and interagency coordination. His background suggests he may be responsible for crafting conflict-termination policy options, balancing domestic pressures with signaling strength to allies and adversaries.

Keith Kellogg: Diplomatic Intermediary

Kellogg, a retired U.S. Army Lieutenant General, served in the military for 36 years, including chief operations officer for the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq. His current position as Presidential Envoy for Ukrainian-Russian Affairs grants him direct access to the President and the ability to engage with key stakeholders in the conflict. 

Kellogg’s detailed policy positions, published for the America First Policy Institute, offer insights into his potential approach. He suggests setting realistic expectations for Ukraine’s security, highlighting Ukraine’s unlikely NATO membership given stringent reform requirements and NATO’s unanimity rule. Instead, Kellogg proposes alternative arrangements outside of NATO with credible and verifiable security guarantees for both Ukraine and Russia to ensure long-term stability. Measures include establishing a demilitarized zone from current lines of contact, limited sanctions relief in exchange for security compliance, and levies on Russian energy sales to finance Ukrainian reconstruction. Notably, Kellogg does not discuss establishing a demilitarized zone along the Belarusian border as part of his plans for a negotiated settlement. 

Kellogg also emphasizes the importance of publicly cordial yet transactional relations with Russia while avoiding rhetoric that could be seen as demonizing or humiliating the Kremlin and mitigating the risk of U.S. actions driving Russia closer to China, Iran, and North Korea. He favors a negotiated settlement based on existing front lines and continued, but conditional, military aid to Ukraine contingent on participation in negotiations.

Unlike Colby, Kellogg is already directly involved in shaping U.S. policy on Ukraine, operating with fewer bureaucratic constraints. His counterpart in the Middle East, Steve Witkoff, offers a useful comparison – both are trusted presidential envoys likely chosen more for their personal rapport with the President than their formal roles. Witkoff’s participation in early U.S.–Russia and U.S.–Ukraine talks suggests that trust, not title, will determine who leads key negotiations.

Not in Sight: Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs

As of this now, no Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs has been nominated. This absence limits the State Department’s ability to influence policy implementation, shifting more decision-making authority toward the White House. Without a senior diplomat overseeing the Europe bureau, European governments face reduced access to influence U.S. policy through traditional diplomatic channels. As a result, European input on U.S. decisions regarding Ukraine and broader regional security is likely to remain limited – particularly for smaller Central European states.

Significance: A White House-Centered Approach

U.S. foreign policy in Europe under the Trump administration appears to be driven primarily by White House officials operating under direct presidential authority, rather than through traditional interagency processes. Colby, Peek, and Kellogg each bring distinct policy preferences and bureaucratic weight to the administration’s approach toward NATO, Ukraine, and Russia.

U.S. foreign policy in Europe under the Trump administration appears to be driven primarily by White House officials operating under direct presidential authority, rather than through traditional interagency processes.

Colby is positioned to influence macro-level defense policy and European military burden sharing. Colby’s access and influence over the President is difficult to determine until he officially enters the position. Moreover, his impact is likely tied to the relationship between Secretary of Defense Hegseth and President Trump, as well as the Department of Defense’s relevance in the decision-making hierarchy. Of the three, Colby’s positions are the most ideologically consistent and well-documented, reflecting a strategic framework that aligns closely with Trump’s political worldview.

Peek will likely focus on translating broader strategic goals and abstract conceptions into implementable policies related to Ukraine and European defense. Reporting from Politico indicates Peek possesses access and influence over policy processes, but it’s currently difficult to confirm. Moreover, it’s a fair assumption that Peek’s alleged place in The National Safety Council bureaucracy and strong relationship with Waltz indicates greater access and influence. Peek’s views appear grounded in policy logic while remaining politically palatable.

Kellogg will act as a direct diplomatic channel between the White House and Ukrainian officials. Paradoxically, despite having direct access to the President, his influence appears to be declining, as evidenced by the emergence of Steve Witkoff in key Russia-related negotiations. Reports suggest Kellogg’s more hawkish stance on Russia may have led to his marginalisation. The timing of Kellogg’s published stances (April 2024) indicates that his positions are politically calculated; whether he retains relevance may depend on his willingness to adapt publicly to shifting White House priorities.

Closing Thoughts: Foreign Policy by Presidential Design

The absence of key State Department personnel reinforces the image of a streamlined, White House-led foreign policy, characterised by direct presidential oversight and reduced interagency consultation. While this structure may allow for faster decision-making, it does so at the expense of broader diplomatic engagement with European allies. European embassies with smaller footprints in Washington, or those politically out of favour with the Trump administration, are likely to be excluded from Ukraine-related and broader security discussions.

The pace and intensity of developments between the U.S., Ukraine, and Russia suggest that a negotiated settlement is a presidential priority, with the national security team focused on implementing directives from above rather than shaping options from below.

In such an environment, messages coming from channels in favor of the president may have more influence on decision-making than internal analytical frameworks. The recent public fallout between Presidents Zelensky and Trump, and Vice President Vance in the Oval Office, further strengthens the notion of a politically driven, White House-centred foreign policy.